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LAW NOTES
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW ON
BOUNDARY DISPUTES
I. INTRODUCTION
Increasing land values continue to emphasize the impor-
tance of an accurate determination of a landowner's boun-
dary. During the past few decades the value of land both in
urban and rural areas has increased tremendously, and, conse-
quently, people are becoming more conscious of the import-
ance of knowing their true property boundary. It follows
that litigation in this area is increasing because in many situa-
tions the court must decide the true boundary. Although the
problem is practically the same in all jurisdictions, the de-
cisions vary in law and effect.
The great majority of the decisions in South Carolina, and
elsewhere, deal primarily with problems of conveyancing
arising out of descriptions in deeds, plats, wills and other
modes of conveyance, but this article will not encompass
these problems. There are several reasons for this, but pri-
marily the law in this area is fairly well settled in most juris-
dictions, there is not a great deal of inconsistency in the de-
cisions, and a treatment of the entire subject is not within
the scope of this survey.
The difficult problems concerning boundaries, and the
problems which will be discussed in this note, are the ques-
tions of adverse possession, acquiescence, and estoppel, mis-
take by the parties in claiming to a boundary line, written
and oral agreements made concerning the boundary, proced-
ural steps necessary in determining the true location of the
boundary, and the types of relief sought by the parties. In
these areas, the law concerning boundaries is in a confused
state. Varying views exist among the jurisdictions, and some-
times a difference of opinion exists in the cases from the
same State. This writing is an attempt to summarize the
law in South Carolina by an analytical grouping of the more
important cases and statutes. Where there is no authority
in South Carolina, materials from other jurisdictions will
be utilized in an effort to round out a consideration of the
problems that have arisen or may arise in South Carolina.
The purpose of the note, and, it is hoped, the end result is
to consider the views of other jurisdictions as well as the
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rules existing in this State in an attempt to arrive at some
basic principles for the determination of a boundary when
these problems arise. Developing trends in this area of law
will also be discussed.
II. ADVERSE POSSESSION DUE TO IGNORANCE OR
MISTAKE IN BOUNDARY
The authorities all agree that a reconciliation of the cases
from the various jurisdictions on this subject is practically
impossible. There is not, however, a mass of divergent views
concerning the law in this area. In reality, there are only
two basic views taken by the courts governing the question
of adverse possession through the ignorance or mistake of
a landowner.
A. Minority View
South Carolina is in accord with the minority rule which
states that where one of two adjoining landowners possesses
a piece of land through inadvertence, ignorance or mistake
as to the true location Qf the boundary, but with the inten-
tion to possess only to the true boundary line, wherever that
may be, the possession is not adverse in character. A vital ele-
ment of adverse possession is wanting-possession with the
intent to dispossess the adjoining landowner.' Primarily, in-
tention is the test and each case must be analyzed on its own
peculiar facts and circumstances.
In Ouzts v. McKnightla the parties who owned 1000 acres
of land as tenants in common sought to have a partition of
the land whereby each party would take an equal share of
500 acres. A surveyor was employed, and commissioners of
partition were appointed to effect the transaction. A plat
was made correctly showing that each party owned 500 acres,
but when the boundaries were laid out on the ground by the
surveyor in 1908, he made a mistake resulting in the plain-
tiff obtaining 425 acres and the defendant 575 acres. More
than 10 years later, but only one year before the action was
commenced by the plaintiff, the defendant discovered the
mistake. The plaintiff sued to rectify the mistake. The de-
fendant set up 10 years adverse possession of the disputed
area as a bar to the action.2 The Court, speaking through Mr.
Justice Gage, stated that the defendant's intention was clearly
1. See Annot., 97 A. L. R. 14 (1935).
la. 114 S. C. 303, 103 S. E. 561 (1920).
2. The statute of limitations for the recovery of real estate in South
Carolina is ten (10) years. CODE OF LAWS OF SouTH CAROLINA § 10-2421
(1952).
2
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not adverse because he testified that up until one year be-
fore the action was brought he supposed that the line as run
was the true line. For this reason, the Court held that the
statute of limitations would not apply, because, when the
defendant stated that he only knew of the mistake one year
before the action was brought, that amounted to saying that
he was on the plaintiff's land, but did not know it and did
not intend to be there.
This case followed the rule laid down in the earlier land-
mark case of Preble v. Maine Cent. R. R. Co.3 which held that
not only must the adjoining landowner claim the disputed
area adversely, but in addition he must show an intention to
claim the area as his own whether it is ultimately found to
be his or the adjoining landowner's. In other words, the sub-
jective test of intention is applied, i.e., whether the occupancy
was through a mistake as to the true boundary or whether
it was an intentional occupancy to a supposed line irrespec-
tive of where the true line may be found to exist.
From this discussion it can be seen that a party claiming
to a supposed line under the mistaken belief that it is the true
line, when in fact it is not, cannot acquire title to the land
by adverse possession in South Carolina because the posses-
sion is not hostile and with the intention to dispossess the
owner.
4
In a very early Maine decision,5 the Court stated much to the
same effect that "a disseisin cannot be committed by mistake
because the intention of the possessor to claim adversely is
an essential ingredient in a disseisin."
These cases following the minority rule illustrate the doc-
trine that mere possession is not alone a sufficient basis for
adverse possession. Merely claiming land to a boundary, be-
lieving it to be the true line, is not sufficient to constitute
the basis of a claim by adverse possession, since the claim of
right must be as broad as the possession.5a Although the
South Carolina law is clear in view of the Ouzts case, the rule
has been criticized by authorities from other jurisdictions.6
This criticism is based upon the common belief that, in most
cases, it is practically impossible to determine the true mo-
tives of the landowner who claims title by adverse possession.
3. 85 Me. 260, 27 Atl. 149 (1893).
4. Ouzts v. McKnight, supra note la.
5. Ross v. Gould, 5 Me. 204 (1828).
5a. See Annot., 97 A. L. R. 14 (1935).
6. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Groves, 42 S. D. 60, 172 N. W. 926 (1919).
[Vol. 12
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The difficult problem is determining what his intention was.
The minority view is also criticized on the grounds that it
invites the witnesses to commit perjury.
B. Majority View
A leading case stating the majority view that intention is
immaterial is French v. Pierce.7 That case held that the men-
tal attitude of the possessor is immaterial, and that an ac-
tual, open and notorious possession which is wrongful since
it is without the consent of the owner is necessarily adverse
and ripens into title in the usual way when the period of the
statute of limitations has run. Proponents of this view con-
tend that the abstract principles laid down in the Ouzts case,"
and cases to the same effect, cannot be applied with certainty
and uniformity because the secret workings of a man's mind
are not open to public inspection or judicial determination
or inquisition, and the ascertainment of intention or motive
always involves an element of speculation. In the Preble case,"
the Court stated that the question of intention "is neither
subtle, recondite, nor refined, but simple, practical, and sub-
stantial. It involves sources of evidence and means of proof
no more difficult or complex than many other inquiries of
a similar character constantly arising in court." This state-
ment is undoubtedly correct in cases where there is positive
evidence of intention; however, it is of little or no assistance
in the majority of cases where the evidence of intention is
not positive but must be gathered from the general circum-
stances of occupation to a visible boundary.' 0
Where there is an actual dispute over a boundary line,
it can usually be determined whether a party intends to
claim to a fixed and visible boundary at all events, or
merely intends to claim provisionally, subject to the
ascertainment of the true line. But perhaps the most
frequent, and certainly the most meritorious, case is
that of the landowner who, without any doubts on the
matter, and without any question or dispute on the part
of the adjoining landowner, enters into and holds posses-
sion to certain boundaries, on the assumption that such
are the true lines and that his domain extends thereto.
Such a person occupies and uses the land as his own,
7. 8 Conn. 439, 21 Am. Dec. 680 (1831).
8. 114 S. C. 303, 103 S. E. 561 (1920).
9. Preble v. Maine Cent. R. R. Co., 85 Me. 260, 27 At. 149 (1893).
10. See Annot., 97 A. L. R. 14 (1935).
19601
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and his occupancy and use thereof are exclusive. Hence,
properly speaking, his possession is adverse. Yet it can-
not be truly said whether he intends to claim to the
visible boundaries at all events, or merely to hold the
property provided the lines are correct, and subject to
the future ascertainment of the real boundary. He has
no positive or conscious intention, one way or the other.
It cannot any more be said that he intends to claim the
property regardless of the location of the true boundary,
than that he does not intend to appropriate the land of
his neighbor.... If the adverse character of possession
depends absolutely upon the intention of the occupants,
the protection of the statute of limitations is limited to
those who deliberately set out to steal the land of their
neighbors and to cases where there has been an actual
dispute as to the location of the boundary. In no other
case does the occupant actually intend to claim the land
adversely, regardless of legal title. And if this doctrine
were followed out, the man who most needs and deserves
the protection of the statute, viz., he who innocently and
inadvertently occupies and improves land beyond his
true boundary, would be left without protection."
C. South Carolina Cases
The trend of authority in this area of the law is that, when
the claim is to a visible boundary, in all events, whether it
be the true line or not, the possession is adverse.'2 Another
South Carolina case 3 dealing with the problem of ignorance
or mistake as to boundary was decided by our Court in 1951.
In this case the Court applied the same rule that was an-
nounced in the Ouzts case and held that the evidence failed to
show that there was any intention to claim adversely to the
true owner.
The case of Klapman v. HookI4 illustrates another method
of dealing with this problem under a somewhat different
factual situation from the Ouzts case.' 5 The Klapman case
held that a boundary line acquiesced in by the parties for a
period of 32 years is conclusively presumed to be the true
boundary. The Court stated that the decision did not conflict
with the Ouzts case and distinguished the cases by saying that
11. See Annot., 80 A. L. R. 155 (1932).
12. See Annot., 97 A. L. R. 14 (1935).
13. Babb v. Harrison, 220 S. C. 20, 66 S. E. 2d 457 (1951).
14. 206 S. C. 51, 32 S. E. 2d 882 (1945).
15. 114 S. C. 303, 103 S. E. 561 (1920).
[Vol. 12
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in the Klapman case the parties did not need to resort to the
claim of title by adverse possession. The decision is based
on the settled rules for determining a disputed boundary in
South Carolina, the pertinent ones being: the rules for de-
termining disputed boundaries are not inflexible, and are
subject to modification depending upon the particular facts,
and the vital question is the intent of the grantor at the time
the deed is executed; 16 in locating a boundary the trees that
the surveyor marked, the rocks that he set up and the fixed
and permanent objects which he called for are more certain
indications of intention than distances or even courses, 17 and
in determining the true boundary the quantity of land named
in the deed is ordinarily one of the lowest scale of impor-
tance.1
8
It is interesting to note that the facts of the Ouzts case and
the Klapmn case, although different, are analagous, yet the
Court used entirely different principles of law in making each
decision. By determining the Klapman case under the doc-
trine of acquiescence, our Court seems to have reached the
same result that could have been reached under the French
v. Pierce rule in a case involving adverse possession. Stated
simply, the Klapman rule is: In South Carolina a boundary
can be established by the acquiescence of the parties for the
period of the statute of limitations applicable to adverse pos-
session cases. The requisite acquiescence is evidence of the
true line so conclusive that the parties are precluded from
offering evidence to the contrary. This rule is called the "rule
of repose", and is supported by the same reasoning that sup-
ports the doctrine of adverse possession.' 9
There are clear indications in several states, including
South Carolina, of the acceptance of a more liberal acquies-
cence rule as an escape from the controversial proposition
that possession to a boundary line in the mistaken belief that
the line is the true line may prevent such possession from
being adverse.20 In one South Carolina case, 2' wherein the
16. Holden v. Cantrell, 100 S. C. 265, 84 S. E. 828 (1912); Conner v.
Johnson, 59 S. G. 115, 37 S. E. 240 (1900). This rule deals particularly
with the description in the deed as a fact to be considered in determin-
ing whether the description in the deed or the boundaries on the ground
should control in a determination of the true boundary line.
17. Sturgeon v. Floyd, 3 Rich. L. 80 (S. C. 1846); Douglas v. Fernan-
dis, 2 Bail. L. 78 (S. C. 1831); 8 Am. JuR. Boundaries § 791 (1937).
18. Holden v. Cantrell, supra note 16.
19. Browder, The Practical Location of Boundaries, 56 Micu. L. Rsv.
505, 511 (1958).
20. Id. at 512, 513.
21. Harrison v. Danoway, 214 S. C. 294, 52 S. E. 2d 264 (1949).
19601
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defendant claimed title to a disputed strip of land by ad-
verse possession because the strip was on defendant's side of
a 30 year old hedge, the Court decided that the evidence did not
sustain a finding of title by adverse possession, because there
was no showing as to the origin of the hedge or that it was
originally intended to mark a boundary line. It was also held
that the evidence failed to establish title in the defendant
under the doctrines of acquiescence or estoppel. By this de-
cision the Court indicated that a hedge generally will be
planted either on one side of the boundary or the other side,
but not upon the correct boundary line. Hedges spread with
growth and age and would soon constitute an encroachment
if set on a boundary, requiring entry on the neighbor's pre-
mises to trim and cultivate. However, it should be noted that
fences are generally placed upon the true boundary line, al-
though the parties are allowed to prove, if they can, that a
fence or hedge was erected only as a barrier or for conven-
ience. Mere proof of the existence of a fence or hedge will not
give rise to any presumptions, and a claim of acquiescence,
adverse possession or estoppel will fail without other proof.
A recent South Carolina case22 held that where the grantor
conveyed land to his son-in-law with whom he lived, and to
the grantor's daughter and children, and planted hedges
along the boundaries of the son-in-law's lot, the family rela-
tionship rebutted the presumption that the son-in-law's pos-
session, perforce the hedges, was hostile to the grantor es-
pecially where the hedges were not planted in a straight line
and no effort was made to plant them on the exact lines of
the lot.
The recent trend of decisions is to give much weight to the
fact of possession of the disputed area under an adverse
claim. They hold that it is the open or visible possession of
the land with the intention to hold it as his own that gives
rise to the adverse character, and, as stated above, the re-
mote belief of the claimant is immaterial.23
The case of Crocker v. Town of Beaufort 4 involved the
question of adverse possession of a strip of land claimed by a
municipality and a private person. The land was claimed
as an alley by the defendant (town) and as a lot by the plain-
tiff. On the first appeal of the case, 2 the Court held that the
22. Metze v. Meetze, 231 S. C. 154, 97 S. E. 2d 514 (1957).
23. 1 Am. Jur. Adverse Possession § 215 (1936).
24. 45 S. C. 269, 22 S. E. 885 (1895).
25. 37 S. 0. 327, 16 S. E. 95 (1891).
[ ol. 12
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plaintiff should be allowed a perpetual injunction against the
defendant as prayed for in his complaint. No question of
estoppel was raised by this appeal, but the plaintiff based his
hope of recovery upon the doctrine of adverse possession.
Our Supreme Court found that the plaintiff had not estab-
lished title to the land by adverse possession, but granted
a new trial on the ground that the defendant might be
estopped to claim the land where the plaintiff had erected
buildings thereon. A second appeal resulted in a dismissal
of the complaint on the ground that the requirements for
an estoppel had not been met since the plaintiff had failed
to show that he would suffer injury if the defendant were
not estopped from claiming the area as an alley.
26
A very early South Carolina case 27 laid down the rule that,
even though a party has good title (by deed) to land, if he
stands by and allows the adjoining landowner to mark out
his boundaries by stakes, which stand for more than ten
years, the adjoining landowner will acquire title by adverse
possession to the extent of his possession marked by the
stakes. No general rule can be stated as to adverse possession
based on the projection or inclination of a wall or other
structure, that is, as to instances where one, either in ig-
norance of the true location of his boundary line or through
mistake or inadvertence, erects a building or a wall, or where
a building leans over the boundary line. The difference of
opinion as to the effect of having taken possession under a
mistake as to boundaries, as stated above, is reflected to
some degree in the cases dealing with projections of buildings
over the line.28 Inasmuch as the authorities on the subject
are few and inconsistent, no general rule can be stated for
determining this matter.29 One case held that title to land
by adverse possession may be based upon the fact that the
wall of a building belonging to the one claiming by adverse
possession leans over the portion of land so claimed;30 how-
ever, it has also been expressed that the tipping of the wall
of a building so as to encroach only upon the air space
above the adjoining lot does not interrupt the continuity of
possession of the owner of such lot so as to bring it within
the provisions of the statute of limitations applicable to
26. Crocker v. Town of Beaufort, 45 S. C. 269, 22 S. E. 885 (1895).
27. Allen v. Johnson, 2 McMul. L. 495 (S. C. 1836).
28. See Annot., 49 A. L. R. 1015 (1927).
29. Ibid.
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cases of persons not in possession.3 1 The majority rule in
this area is that if the building is of a permanent nature
and projects over the boundary line for the statutory period
necessary to establish a title by adverse possession, the pos-
sessor of the building will acquire title by adverse possession
even though the building was erected in ignorance of the
location of the true boundary line and supposedly on land
rightfully owned by the builder.3 2 There are no South Caro-
lina cases dealing with this problem, but presumably our
Courts would treat such a situation under the doctrines of
estoppel or acquiescence rather than allowing title to be ac-
quired by adverse possession. This supposition is based upon
the past decisions concerning the intention of the party where
he was ignorant as to the true location of the boundary line.
It has been decided in other jurisdictions that even though
the title may be acquired by adverse possession to that part
of the adjoining lot upon which the permanent structure
has been erected, the possessor of such a building does not
acquire title to that part of the adjbining lot not covered by
his building, but which would have been covered had his build-
ing been extended in line with the original wall for the full
length of the lot.33 The minority view is that there must be
some evidence, other than the continuous and exclusive occu-
pancy of a building which, through inadvertence and ignor-
ance of the true boundary line, is erected so that it projects
a few inches over the dividing line of a city lot upon an
adjoining lot, of an intention to claim title to the strip en-
croached upon, before title thereto can be obtained by ad-
verse possession.34 The rule in Virginia is that an encroach-
ment on adjoining property, through mistake, by one in the
erection of his building, is not such possession as will ripen
into title by lapse of time; the person who permits the erec-
tion of the building partly on his land is not thereby estopped
from asserting his rights when he learns for the first time
of the encroachment.3 5 If the problem arises in South Caro-
lina, it is reasonable to presume that our courts would be
in accord with the minority view just expressed, making in-
tention the test.
31. Kafka v. Bozio, 191 Cal. 746, 218 Pac. 753, 29 A. L. R. 833 (1923).
32. See Annot., 49 A. L. R. 1015 (1927); Annot., 97 A. L. R. 14
(1935).
33. Ibid.
34. Winn v. Abeles, 35 Kan. 85, 10 Pac. 443 (1886); Wilson v. Hun-
ter, 59 Ark. 626, 28 S. W. 419 (1894).
35. Davis v. Owen, 107 Va. 283, 58 S. E. 581 (1907).
[Vol. 12
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III. ESTABLISHMENT OF BOUNDARIES BY ACTS OF THE PARTIES
OTHER THAN THOSE ACTS NECESSARY TO ACQUIRE
TITLE BY ADVERSE POSSESSION
A. Oral Agreements
It is a well settled principle of law that where the adjoin-
ing landowners are uncertain as to where the correct bound-
ary lies, they can establish a true boundary by a written
agreement. This is also true where the boundary line is
in dispute.36 An oral agreement fixing a boundary line is
valid, (1) if intended to settle a bona fide dispute; (2) if pos-
session is enjoyed thereunder; and especially (3) if acqui-
escence thereto has been manifested over a long period of
time.37 The latter statement represents the general rule
regarding parol boundary agreements. The South Carolina
rule is that a boundary line may be permanently established
by parol agreement of the adjoining landowners when there
is doubt or uncertainty or a dispute has arisen as to the true
location of the boundary line. In such a situation, a parol
agreement can be used to establish the line; and, where the
agreement is executed and actual possession is taken under
the agreement, it is conclusive against the owners and those
claiming under them.33 Mr. Chief Justice McIver stated in
Davis v. Elmore:9 "s] urely there cannot be any doubt that
where the dividing line between two co-terminous proprietors
is doubtful, and for the purpose of solving such doubt they
meet together and establish an agreed line, such agreed line
must be regarded in all future controversies to be the true
line."
When there is an honest dispute as to the location of a di-
viding boundary, an oral agreement between adjoining own-
ers fixing a boundary is not within the Statute of Frauds
and becomes enforceable when the agreed boundary has been
marked, or has been recognized in the subsequent use of the
tracts, or when other action has been taken by either party
in reliance on the agreement.40 One of the requirements for
a valid parol agreement fixing the boundary is that there
be a real dispute or uncertainty concerning the true location.
When this requirement is met, in addition to the other re-
36. 8 Am. JuR. Boundies § 83 (1937).
37. BURBY, REAL PROPERTY § 250 (2d ed. 1954).
38. Davis v. Elmore, 40 S. C. 533, 19 S. E. 204 (1894); Welch v. Car-
ter, 151 S. C. 145, 148 S. E. 697 (1929).
39. 40 S. C. 533, 19 S. E. 204 (1894).
40. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 196 (1932).
1960]
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quirements which will be discussed presently, the agreement
is treated not as a parol transfer of land, but as a settlement
of the dispute or problem of uncertainty between the con-
tiguous tracts of land. It serves to locate the line to which
the title of each landowner extends.4 1
Like other contracts, a parol agreement must be supported
by a consideration,42 but it is generally held that the mutual
concessions by the parties in determining the disputed or un-
certain boundary is sufficient.43 Some cases have indicated,
and it is probably the rule in South Carolina, that there must
be some improvement or possession in the absence of some
other valuable consideration. 4' In the Slice case the parties
made a parol agreement to partition a certain tract of land,
but neither party carried the agreement into effect by tak-
ing possession. The Court held that, since a mere parol agree-
ment had been made without any occupation, possession or
improvement, the parol partition was not binding upon either
party to it. Another South Carolina case45 held that a parol
partition is binding upon the parties if there is sufficient
proof of part performance to take it out of the Statute of
Frauds. It was also stated that actual possession is the
most satisfactory evidence of part performance. From a
thorough search of the law in South Carolina regarding
such parol agreements, the writer has found no rules re-
garding what our Court would do with a mere parol agree-
ment to settle the disputed boundary unaccompanied by any
acts of possession, improvement or occupation. It is be-
lieved that such an agreement would be treated as being
within the Statute of Frauds.
Other problems that arise in the various jurisdictions are:
whether there is a necessity that the line be definite, or a
necessity for the parties to hold or acquiesce under the parol
agreement for a specific period of time (as for the time
required under the rules for acquiring title to a disputed
strip by adverse possession), and the effect of mistake and
the conclusiveness of the agreement.46 Many of these prob-
lems have yet to arise in this State, but one case which deals
primarily with the binding effect of a parol agreement may
41. See Annot., 69 A. L. R. 1430 (1930); Ann. Cas. 1912B 663; 8
Ann. Cas. 84 (1908) ; 102 Am. St. Rep. 246 (1905).
42. Wood v. Bapp, 41 .. D. 195, 169 N. W. 518 (1918).
43. Randleina v. Taylor, 94 Ark. 511, 127 S. W. 723 (1910).
44. Slice v. Derrick, 2 Rich. L. 627 (S. 0. 1846).
45. Kennemore v. Kennemore, 26 S. . 251, 1 S. E. 881 (1886).
46. See Annot, 69 A. L. IL 1430 (1930).
[Vol. 12.
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shed some light on the subject.47 The rule there stated is
that where a disputed, uncertain, or unascertained boundary
is settled by parol agreement, and such agreement is followed
by occupation in accordance therewith, it is binding not only
on the immediate parties to the agreement, but also on those
claiming under them.
On principle it would seem that an oral contract for par-
tition or fixing boundaries would be unenforceable on the
ground that it is a conveyance or attempted conveyance of
real estate which is in violation of the Statute of Frauds ;48
however, many states hold the agreement valid, at least if
acted upon, and the requirements which are generally in-
sisted upon in order to make executory oral contracts bind-
ing because of part performance are not always considered. 49
In Rountree v. Lane,50 where the parties made an oral par-
tition of the land, took possession and retained the land pur-
suant to the agreement for a period of 11 years, it was de-
cided that the oral agreement was valid and would be up-
held. It has been specifically held in this State that parol
partitions are recognized, but they bind only the participants
therein.5' It is the general rule in the United States that such
parol agreements are valid if there was a bona fide dispute
existing between the parties as to the location of the bound-
ary; however, if the actual boundary is known, an oral con-
tract to substitute a new line is invalid.
52
B. Acquiescence
The Klapman case 53 indicates that a disputed boundary line
can be established between the parties by acquiescence of
the palties for the period of the statute of limitations appli-
cable to adverse possession cases, even though no actual parol
agreement has been made. Mere acquiescence for the suf-
ficient period of time is deemed adequate. Presumably this
reasoning is based on public policy in an attempt to prevent
vexatious litigation of a multiplicity of suits. The case holds
that the requisite acquiescence is evidence of the true line
47. Davis v. Elmore, 40 S. C. 533, 19 S. E. 204 (1894).
48. Jones v. Reeves, 6 Rich. L. 132 (S. C. 1853); WLISTON, CON-
TRAcTS § 490 (Rev. ed. 1936).
49. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 494 (Rev. ed. 1936); Sparks v. Union
Mfg. Co., 121 S. C. 220, 114 S. E. 805 (1922) (the oral partition was
held to be binding only on the participants); Rountree v. Lane, 32 S. C.
160, 10 S. E. 941 (1890).
50. 32 S. C. 160, 10 S. E. 941 (1890).
51. Sparks v. Union Mfg. Co., supst note 49.
52. WLLISTON, CONTRACTS § 490 (Rev..ed. 1936).
53. Klapman v. Hook, 206 ,. C, 51, 82 &, E, 2d 882 (1945).
1960]
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-so conclusive that the parties are precluded from offering
,evidence to the contrary. The rule (as stated earlier in the
-reatment of adverse possession) is called the "rule of re-
1pose", which is supported by the same reason as supports the
rdoctrine of adverse possession.
There is a great deal of confusion in the cases from vari-
ous jurisdictions dealing with the establishment of boundaries
by agreement and/or acquiescence. The rules regarding the
two methods of settling the boundary dispute have been con-
sidered separately by some jurisdictions and together by other
jurisdictions." Under the reasoning of the Klapmacn. case, 55
our Court seems to treat the doctrine of parol agreements
fixing boundaries separately from the doctrine of establish-
ing the boundary by acquiescence, because the Court sets
forth the rule that a boundary line acquiesced in by the par-
ties for 32 years is conclusively presumed to be the true
boundary line. There was no agreement existing as to a de-
termination of the true boundary, and even if there had been,
the same result would have been reached.
The general rule followed in South Carolina regarding ac-
quiescence is stated as follows:
It is well established that if adjoining landowners oc-
cupy their respective premises up to a certain line which
they mutually recognize and acquiesce in for a long period
of time - usually the time prescribed by the statute of
limitations - they are precluded from claiming that
the boundary line thus recognized and acquiesced in is
not the true one. In other words, such recognition of,
and acquiescence in, a line as the true boundary line, if
continued for a sufficient length of time, will afford a
conclusive presumption that the line thus acquiesced in
is the true boundary line.5 6
A recent South Carolina decision stated that where it was
agreed between a prospective grantee of land and the ad-
joining landowner that the line which was run by the sur-
veyor for the purpose of making a plat to be attached to the
,deed was tentative and subject to adjustment, the rule that
an agreed line must be regarded in all future controversies
to be the true line is inapplicable. 57
54. 8 Am . JUR. Boundaries § 81 (1937).
55. Klapman v. Hook, supra note 53.
56. 8 Am. JuR. Boundaries § 80 (1937), quoted by Mr. Justice Oxner
in Klapman v. Hook, supra note 53.
57. Richardson v. Register, 227 S. 0. 81, 87 S. E. 2d 40 (1955).
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C. Location of Fences and Hedges
Still another boundary problem is that of the practical loca-
tion of the true boundary line by means of a fence erection
or other markings such as the planting of hedges.58 Again
the authorities and cases are in conflict on the treatment of
this problem. Some cases have said that a presumption of a
prior agreement may arise where the adjoining landowners
have definitely defined the line by erecting a fence thereon,
and that both have treated it as fixing the boundary between
them and should not be allowed to deny the correctness of
its location.5 9
Other cases have found that the erection of a fence may be
evidence of the true location of the boundary line which it
was intended to make, and acquiescence in it for a reasonable
length of time may possibly become binding on the adjacent
landowners ;60 however, where the doctrine of simple acqui-
escence is recognized, no agreement need be recognized as to
the erection of the fence.6' A fence may be erected for con-
venience only, and without any intention of fixing a bound-
ary; the fence may exist for only a short period of time or
it may be erected by mistake by one party while the adjoining
property owner had the means of knowing where the true
line was.0 2
In Harrison v. Lanoway63 our Court denied the defendant's
claim to a disputed strip by adverse possession, acquiescence
or estoppel because the evidence failed to show the origin of
a hedge planted on or near the dividing line, and because
no intention was indicated by the evidence that the hedge
was supposed to mark the boundary line. The Court indi-
cated that a claim of acquiescence would fail without proof
other than the mere existence of the fence for a long time.
Another case involving the planting of hedges came before
our Court recently on the issue of adverse possession.64 It
was held that since the hedges were not planted along the
boundary in a straight line and no effort was made to do
so, the planting of them did not amount to hostile possession
as one of the requirements of title by adverse possession.
58. French v. Pierce, 8 Conn. 439, 69 A. L. R. 1515 (1831).
59. 8 Am. JuR. Boundaries § 82 (1937).
60. Bradley v. Burkhart, 139 Ia. 323, 115 N. W. 597 (1908).
61. Hanlon v. Ten Hove, 235 Mich. 227, 209 N. W. 169, 46 A. L. R.
788 (1926).
62. 8 AM. JuR. Boundaries § 82 (1937).
63. 214 S. C. 294, 52 S. E. 2d 264 (1949).
64. Metze v. Meetze, 231 S. C. 154, 97 S. E. 2d 514 (1957).
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Another South Carolina case65 stated that acquiescence in
an adjoining owner's moving a fence would not work an
estoppel to a denial that the fence as relocated was the true
boundary as against the adjoining owner, although it might as
to innocent purchasers. A discrepancy between the straight
boundary fence shown in the plat and an existing irregular
fence presented a question for the jury aside from the ques-
tions of estoppel by acquiescence.
"The doctrine of agreed boundaries rests somewhere be-
tween adverse possession and estoppel. Many cases of agreed
boundaries involving the elements of adverse possession are
referred to that principle for decision. In like manner, many
such cases involving elements of estoppel are said to be refer-
able to this doctrine."00" There are very few cases in South
Carolina on this topic.
D. Expenditures
A striking application of the doctrine of estoppel has been
made in South Carolina in a case involving silence on the part
of one landowner in the face of expenditures by his neighbor,
which were made on certain assumptions by the latter as to
the correct boundary. 7 In this case the Court applied the
doctrine of estoppel in pais in settlement of the boundary
dispute, and held that an estoppel may arise in less than
the time required to acquire title by adverse possession.
In Marchant v. Felder"" the rule was established that a
party to a boundary agreement is estopped to deny it against
a subsequent purchaser from him of his lot. The case also held
that a purchaser is not estopped, as against his grantor,
from insisting upon a true location of the boundary line by
making a purchase price payment after a discovery of an
error in the line; and, where a landowner makes a party
Wall agreement up to which the adjoining landowner con-
structed buildings, the landowner is thereby estopped to
claim beyond the agreed line, even as against his own grantee.
The rule is this area was stated in the case of So. R. R. Co. v.
Davis:00 "So, if a party stands by, and sees another deal-
ing with property in a manner inconsistent with his rights,
and makes no objection, he cannot afterwards have relief.
65. Van Ness v. Schachte, 143 S. C. 429, 141 S. E. 721 (1928).
66. 8 AM. JUR. Boundaries § 83 (1937).
67. McClintic v. Davis, 228 S. C. 378, 90 S. E. 2d 364 (1955); South-
ern R. R. Co. v. Day, 140 S. C. 388, 138 S. E. 870 (1926).
68. 107 S. C. 516, 93 S. E. 179 (1917).
69. 140 S. C. 388, 138 S E. 870 (1926).
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His silence permits or encourages others to part with their
money or property, and he cannot complain that his interests
are affected. His silence is acquiescence and it estops him."
Lord Hardwicke said: "There are several instances where
a man has suffered another to go on with building upon
his ground and not set up a right till afterwards, when he
was all the time conversant of his right, and the person
building had no notice of the other's right, in which the
court would oblige the owner of the ground to permit the
person building to enjoy quietly and without disturbance.
' 70
The earliest case in South Carolina dealing with the problem
of estoppel in pais followed the rule set forth by Lord Hard-
wicke, 71 and the same rule has been applied to these situa-
tions ever since.72 The same rule has applied where railroad
property such as rights of way are involved.7 3 In the case
of Piedmont & Northern Ry. v. Henderson, 3a the Court in-
voked the doctrine of estoppel in pais against the plaintiff
railroad where it had originally acquired a lot for a right of
way but during the ensuing years had permitted the de-
fendant and others who owned the adjoining lot to build a
house, erect a fence and plant a hedge on the unused portion
of the plaintiff's lot. Not only did the defendanits acquire
title to that portion of the lot upon which the house wa'
Qon.structed, but they also acquired the unused portion of the
lot including the hedge and the fence.
IV. ACTIONS FOR. DETERMINATION OF DISPUTED BOUNDARIES -
HOW THE QUESTION IS RAISED
A. Actions at Law and Equity
The greatest amount of boundary litigation today involves
the ascertainment of the boundary as it actually exists on the
ground with reference to the description in a conveyance, viz.,
the determination of the exact limits of the tract conveyed.74
However, as stated earlier, this area of boundary problems
is not dealt with at length by this article.
Aside from statutory proceedings, there is no proceeding
at law by which one owner of land can obtain an adjudication
70. The East India Co. v. Vincent, 2 Atk. 83 (1740).
71. Lessee of Tarrant v. Terry, 1 Bay L. 239 (S. C. 1792).
72. MeClintic v. Davis, 228 S. C. 378, 90 S. E. 2d 364 (1955); Marines
v. Goblet, 31 S. C. 153, 9 S. E. 803 (1888).
73. Columbia, Newberry & Laurens R. R. Co. v. Laurens Cotton Mills,
82 &. C. 24, 61 S. E. 1089 (1908). See also Piedmont & Northern R. R.
Co. v. Henderson, 216 S. C. 98, 56 S. E. 2d 740 (1949).
73a. 216 S. 0. 98, 56 S. E. 2d 740 (1949).
74. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY §§ 670 - 676 (Abr. ed. 1940).
1960]
16
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 3 [], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol12/iss3/3
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY
concerning the proper location of his boundary line, although
he has a remedy by trespass or ejectment for a disregard of
the proper line by the adjoining landowner.75 Many states
have eacted statutes which expressly confer jurisdiction on
particular courts to ascertain and establish boundary lines
which are uncertain or in dispute, by means of "procession-
ers", who, after investigation, report to the court, which
may or may not approve their finding.76 In some states a
court of equity may issue a commission to determine a bound-
ary where there is some ground for equitable interference
other than the mere uncertainty of the boundary, mainly
where such a determination will avoid a multiplicity of suits
by the parties.
77
Generally speaking, there are various ways in which dis-
puted boundary questions can arise, and they can be deter-
mined in South Carolina by bringing an action at law such as
ejectment where title is in dispute, or trespass where the com-
plainant has not been dispossessed. An action for damages
may be brought based on negligence; an action will be enter-
tained by a court of equity when the parties have no ade-
quate remedy at law; or the parties may bring the matter
of a disputed boundary under the Declaratory Judgment
Act.
78
A leading case in this area is Uxbridge Co. v. Poppenheim.0
In this case the plaintiff claimed that he had previously made
several attempts to get the defendant to aid him in ascertain-
ing the true boundary line and to settle the matter amicably,
but the defendant had refused to cooperate in any manner,
thereby causing plaintiff's inability to use his land up to the
correct boundary line. When the plaintiff failed to reach
any agreement with the defendant, he sought equitable relief
praying that the court appoint surveyors to establish the
disputed lines. The trial court sustained a demurrer by the
defendant on the ground that the complaint failed to state
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action either legal
or equitable. The court held that there was nothing in the
complaint to show a trespass or other wrong, neither were
there any peculiar facts which would warrant equitable inter-
75. LFAXE, PROPERTY IN LAND § 10 (1874); SEDGEwIcx & WAIT, TRIAL
OF TITLE TO LAND § 865 (1882).
76. Amos v. Parker, 88 Ca. 754, 16 S. E. 200 (1892); Love v. Mor-
rill, 19 Ore. 545, 24 Pac. 916 (1890).
77. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 452 (1940).
78. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA §§ 10-2001 - 10-2014 (1952).
79. 135 S. C. 26, 133 S. E. 461 (1926).
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ference. On appeal, our Supreme Court laid down several
rules of law which are the governing principles in this pro-
cedural area:
It appears to be settled by the unanimous opinion of
Judges and text writers that ordinarily the matter of
settling disputed questions of boundaries is ancillary
to actions at law of trespass to try title or ejectment (as
indicated by Section 5308, Vol. 3, Code of 1922), and
that equity will not entertain an action simply to settle
and fix a boundary line between adjoining owners, un-
less the plaintiff's complaint discloses some feature of
equitable cognizance, as, for instance, fraud or miscon-
duct on the part of an adjoining landowner, by reason
of which a confusion or obliteration of the boundary line
has resulted; mutual mistake of the adjoining owners;
the neglect of a duty founded upon the relationship of
the parties; the practical certainty of a multiplicity of
suits growing out of the confusion or uncertainty; and
the inadequacy of a remedy at law (perhaps others),
We cannot but be impressed with the well-known fact
among our people, in whom the Anglo-Saxon tenacity to
the ownership or claimed ownership of land is prover-
bial,, that no more prolific source of misunderstandings,
leading to altercations, breaches of friendly relations,
and community and social obligations, and even to homi-
cides, exists than disputes over boundary lines. It is diffi-
cult to conceive of a proceeding that would tend more
readily to compose these differences than a suit in equity;
to turn the energy of wranglers into a channel of use-
fulness and productiveness and peacefulness. As a mat-
ter of public policy, to settle disputes, to prevent law-
suits, and avoid altercations and bloodshed, the remedy
in equity should not only be allowed but encouraged.
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the lower cour.
by saying that the plaintiff had no adequate remedy at law
since he did not know where the boundary line was, that he
could' not successfully proceed at law unless he knew where
the line was at one time or another, and that to refuse to give
plaintiff the right to proceed in equity against the defend-
ant would create a multiplicity of suits by the defendant if
the plaintiff took steps such as attempting to fence or en-
19601
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close a part of the disputed territory. The Court reasoned
that all of this could be avoided by allowing the court of equity
to appoint surveyors, and that the matter could be handled
expeditiously and with the protection of all parties concerned.
The respondent had relied strongly on the McCreery case80
in which it was held:
A mere confusion of boundaries of land is not sufficient
to give a Court of Equity jurisdiction. There must be
some equity in addition thereto. If the ordinary legal
remedies are adequate, they must be resorted to. The
legal remedies provided by our Code for the recovery of
possession of land by one out of possession against an-
other in possession claiming title, are ordinarily adequate
to settle disputed boundaries.
The Court held that the rule announced was a correct one,
but the case was distinguished from the Uxbridge case in that
the complaint in the McCreery case was substantially an action
to recover possession of a strip of land in the possession of
the defendant who claimed title to the strip.
McRae v. Hamer"' supports the rule laid down in the Ux-
bridge case. The McRae case was an action to define and have
settled a boundary line between the parties. The plaintiff
contended that the defendant had destroyed the original evi-
dence of the line, such as marks, trees, and monuments.
Plaintiff also contended that a court of equity should settle
the matter in order to prevent a multiplicity of suits. Our
Court followed the rules in other jurisdictions by saying that
equity would entertain a suit involving a disputed boundary
where there has been fraud or misconduct on the part of
the defendant which results in the confusion of the boundary,
where the relation between the adjoining landowners is such
that there is a duty to protect and preserve the boundary, or
where there will be a multiplicity of actions if equity does
not entertain the action. The facts of the case showed that the
defendant had mortgaged the tract of land in dispute and that
if the plaintiff should succeed in an action at law to recover it,
he would later have to reckon with the mortgagee and bring a
similar action against him or one to remove A cloud upon his
title. Although the Court held that a court of equity did have
jurisdiction to settle the original boundary line as it had exist-
ed, it stated that such a decision would affect the questions of
80. McCreery v. Myers 70 S. C. 282, 49 S. E. 848 (1904).
81. 148 S. C. 403, 146 S. E. 243 (1929).
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title or right of possession. Therefore, it can be seen that if the
defendant in such a case has been successful in the equity
court, he may set up legal defenses such as adverse posses-
sion, estoppel, acquiescence, title by prescription, and per-
haps others, to any law action later brought by the plain-
tiff. In such an action at law, the parties have a right to a
trial by jury, whereas in the court of equity no such right
exists.
By statute in South Carolina surveyors may be appointed
to aid in determining the boundary line between the parties.
8 2
This statute applies only when a survey is necessary. In an
action for damages, where the defendant's affidavit for order
of survey does not show a necessity and the pleadings do not
suggest a necessity, the court is not bound to issue an order
of survey.88 If a survey is necessary, the trial is postponed
until it is made.8 4 If the parties (either of them) refuse to
nominate a surveyor, the court shall nominate two or more
surveyors as it deems proper-s ' Our CIRCUIT COURT RULE 36
provides for a court order of survey in actions to recover
land, but the rule does not require a survey.86 A very recent
South Carolina case87 pointed out that the statute providing
for a survey by order of the court was not mandatory.8 8 In
construing the statute, the Court stated, quoting from the case
of Cruikshnznks v. Frean:8 9 "Either party may resort to it
when for the want of other evidence of identity it becomes
necessary; but when they thinlk proper to put their rights
uppn othei evidence, it would be a strange construction to
compel them to provide more than was necessary."
B. Actions Under the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act
An action involving the problems discussed herein may be
brought under the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act which
was adopted in South Carolina in 1948.00
In general, it may be said that declaratory judgments
82. ConE OF LAWS OP SOUTH CAROLINA § 57-452 (1952).
83. Welsh v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co., 107 S. C. 534, 93 S. E. 196
(1917); See also Cruikshanks v. Frean, 3 McC. L. 84 (S. C. 1825).
84. Gourdine v. Theus, 2 Brev. L. 35 (S.C. 1806)
85. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA § 57-452 (1952).
86. Lucius v. DuBose, 114 S. C. 375, 103 S. E. 759 (1920); Patter-
son v. Crenshaw, 32 & C. 534, 11 S. E. 390 (1890). See also Little v.
Little, 223 S. C. 322, 75 S. E. 2d 871 (1953) (gives the rule to follow
in making the survey under a court order).
87. Rush v. Thigpen, 231 S. 0. 230, 98 S. E. 2d 245 (1957).
88. CoDs OF LAWS OP SOUTH CAROLINA § 57452 (1952).
89. 3 McC. L. 84 (S. C. 1825).
90. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA §§ 10-2001 - 10-2014 (1952).
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acts are designed to supply former deficiencies in legal
procedure and to furnish a full and adequate remedy
where none existed before, rather than to supplant or
displace pre-existing and effective remedies or to pro-
vide a substitute for other regular actions. Their real
value lies in the fact that in cases coming within their
scope they enable parties to have their rights and obli-
gations determined without either of them being obliged
to assume the responsibility and the risk of acting upon
his view of the matter and thus repudiating what may
subsequently be held to be his obligations or violating
what may be held to be the other party's rights. They
are not intended to furnish a means by which the courts
may be called upon for mere advisory opinions or re-
quired to decide moot or abstract questions.9 1
This Act has been used very sparingly since its adoption, but
it provides a very efficient means of settling a dispute be-
tween the parties where there is uncertainty or insecurity
respecting the legal rights of the parties. The Act is designed
to give preventive justice by bringing about a complete and
expedient determination of the rights of the parties. Its pur-
pose is to settle a controversy between the parties before it
reaches the litigable stage. Many times where the parties
cannot obtain equitable relief, they may seek a declaratory
judgment by the court. South Carolina has had a statutory
provision permitting declaratory judgments since, 1922;92
however, the scope of this early statute was limited.9 3 The Act
of 1948 is to be liberally construed, and the granting of a
declaratory judgment rests within the sound discretion of
the trial judge.9 4 Declaratory relief should not be accorded to
try a controversy by piecemeal or to try 'particular issues
without settling the entire controversy, and such relief will
not be granted when remedy is invoked merely to try issues
or determine the validity of defenses in pending cases. 5
The Act is discussed very clearly by Judge Lide in
1 S. C. L. Q. 58, and, for the purposes of boundary disputes,
91. 16 Am. Jun. Declaratory Judgements § 7 (1938); noted in 1
S. C. L. Q. 58 (1948).
92. Act No. 542 of Acts and Joint Resolutions, 32 STAT. 967 (1922).
93. Daniel, Atty. Gen. v. Conestee Mills, 183 S. C. 337, 191 S. E. 176
(1937).
94. Southern R. R. Co. v. Order of R. R. Conductors of America, 210
S. C. 121, 41 S. E. 2d 744 (1947).
95. Williams Furn. Corp. v. Southern Coating & Chemical Co., 216
S. C. 1, 56 S. E. 2d 578 (1949); see also 11 S. C. L. Q. 110. (1958).
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a complete summary of the cases involving the Act seems
unnecessary. Suffice it to say that the Act is a proper means
of raising the question of a boundary dispute in our State.
The most recent case involving a boundary line which was
brought under the Act is Rush v. Thigpen.96 In that case the
plaintiff sought injunctive relief against the defendant's tres-
pass on the plaintiff's lands where the defendant was cut-
ting and removing timber therefrom. The action was for de-
termination of the boundary line and for a declaration of the
rights of the parties. The Supreme Court held that even
though the action was brought under the Declaratory Judg-
ment Act, it was essentially an action of trespass to try title
and the plaintiffs, therefore, must recover on the strength of
their own title rather than on the weakness of the defend-
ant's title.
ALLEN LEVERN RAY.
96. 231 S. C. 230, 98 S. E. 2d 245 (1957).
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